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RECONSIDERING THE DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVE
REQUIREMENT IN ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT
CASES
MICHAEL D. MOBERLY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA")'
generally prohibits employers from discriminating against persons over
the age of forty on the basis of age. 2 An individual bringing suit under
the ADEA typically proceeds under one of two theories of discrimination,
disparate impact or disparate treatment. 3 Both of these theories originated
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
in cases
4
VII"1).

The United States Supreme Court has described the distinction between
the two Title VII theories in the following terms:
"Disparate treatment" .

.

. is the most easily understood type of

discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity. 5
Under a theory of disparate impact, an ADEA claimant challenges
facially-neutral employment practices that have a discriminatory impact

* Michael D. Moberly received his B.B.A. and his J.D. from the University of Iowa, and is
a member of the law firm of Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite in Phoenix, Arizona. He is Vice Chairman
of the Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board and serves on the Editorial Review Board
of the Arizona Labor Letter. The author wishes to thank Professor Howard Eglit of the Illinois
Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law, who not only was helpful but particularly
gracious in reviewing and commenting on an article that takes issue with some of his own conclusions.
The research and editorial assistance of Marie McCulloch, a graduate of the University of New
Mexico School of Law and associate at Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, also is acknowledged and
appreciated.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
2. Id. §§ 623, 631.
3. Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1986).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See generally
Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d Il, 117 (3d Cir.) ("Because in many respects the
provisions of the ADEA parallel those of Title VII, many courts have adapted to issues of age
discrimination the principles of law applicable to cases arising under Title VII."), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 937 (1983).
5. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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on persons over the age of forty. 6 In bringing such a claim, the plaintiff
need not show an intent to discriminate on the basis of age.7
Proof of discrimination under the disparate treatment theory, on the
other hand, requires a showing that the employer treated the plaintiffs
less favorably because of their age. 8 Accordingly, the courts generally
require that plaintiffs bringing ADEA disparate treatment claims must,
like Title VII plaintiffs9, make a showing of discriminatory motive.' 0

6. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990).
7. Id. at 1424. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII case).
The propriety of extending disparate impact analysis to cases arising under the ADEA actually
is unsettled. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) ("The disparate treatment
By
theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of the statute makes clear ....
contrast, we have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under
the ADEA, . . . and we need not do so here."); see also id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[Nlothing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the soAs the Court acknowledges, . . . we have not
called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII ....
yet addressed the question whether such a claim is cognizable under the ADEA, and there are
substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to
the ADEA.").
The argument against extending disparate impact analysis to the ADEA may have been given
additional credence by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105,
105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991). In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the
Supreme Court, in the words of one commentator, had "redefined and may have all but eliminated
the disparate impact branch of Title VII analysis." David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619, 1644
n.52 (1991). In response, Congress codified the disparate impact theory in Title VII when it enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress did not codify the theory in the ADEA, however, despite
amending the ADEA in other respects at that time. See LEx K. LARSON, Cwra RIGHTS ACT OF
1991 8 (1992) ("The rules as to burden of proof in disparate impact litigation apply on their face
only to Title VII, not to the ADEA."). The distinction may suggest that the applicability of disparate
impact theory is limited to cases arising under Title VII. See Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.:
We need not speculate on how much of the theory of disparate impact . .. survives
Wards Cove ... ; or what, if any, bearing section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, affirming disparate impact, has on that question; or whether [that section
of] the new civil rights act has any possible bearing on an age discrimination suit,
...since it does not amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... ; or
whether disparate impact has ever been a viable theory of age discrimination ....
967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 1337,
1348-49 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Congress did . . . amend the ADEA in certain sections of the [Civil Rights
Act of 1991] . .. and, therefore, the decision to limit the scope of [other sections] to Title VII is
significant"); cf. Guillory-Wuerz v. Brady, 785 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Colo. 1992) (court declined
to "look to the new amendments affecting Title VII for guidance in ADEA litigation"); Morgan
v. Servicemaster Co., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1424 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (declining to
extend the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amending Title VII's damage provisions to
ADEA cases). But see Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("The treatment of disparate impact claims under Title VII, and arguably the treatment
of such claims arising under the ADEA, has been altered by the recent enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 .... "); Berger v. Edgewater Corp., 784 F. Supp. 263, 266 n.3 (W.D. Pa.
1991) (suggesting, without deciding, that the disparate impact provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 would apply in ADEA cases); LEx K. LARSON, CriL RIGHrs ACT OF 1991 8 (1992) ("disparate
impact claims are recognized under the ADEA, and the courts will no doubt be guided by Congress'
expression of those rules in the new law").
8. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993); see also Rose v. Wells Fargo
& Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990).
9. Cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 646 (1989) ("evidence of the employer's
subjective intent to discriminate ... is required in a [Title VII] 'disparate-treatment' case").
10. See Hazen Paper Co., 113 S. Ct. at 1706 ("In a disparate treatment case, liability depends
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However, differences between the language of the ADEA and that of
Title VII, and perhaps between the nature of age discrimination and the
types of discrimination prohibited by Title VII, suggest that it may not
be appropriate to require plaintiffs to establish a discriminatory motive
on the part of an employer in order to prevail in an ADEA disparate
treatment case." That possibility, occasionally referred to in this article
as the "strict liability" approach to ADEA liability,' 2 represents a substantial departure from traditional disparate treatment analysis as it has
evolved from Title VII case law.' 3 This article addresses the merits and
ramifications of such an approach.
II.

INITIAL INTIMATIONS OF A STRICT LIABILITY
APPROACH TO ADEA LIABILITY
The first extended discussion of a strict liability approach to ADEA
4
disparate treatment liability appears in Kelly v. American Standard, Inc.
The plaintiff in Kelly was a sales representative selected for discharge as
part of his employer's decision to reduce its sales force.' 5 The plaintiff,
who was fifty-seven at the time of his discharge, contended that he had
been selected for termination in order to make room for younger salesmen. 6
The case was tried before a jury, 17 which returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff.' The court declined to award liquidated
damages,' 9
20
however, and the plaintiff cross-appealed on that issue.
on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision.").
See generally Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706' F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir.) ("a plaintiff alleging
disparate treatment, whether under Title VII or under the ADEA, bears the ultimate burden of
persuading the jury that his treatment was 'caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination')
(quoting Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); Kelly
v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1981).
12. The characterization is drawn from cases arising under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the
"Equal Pay Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978), which frequently is said to reflect "a type of strict
liability" because the plaintiff is not required to establish a discriminatory intent on the part of
the employer in order to prevail. Strecker v. Grand Forks Cty. Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 99
n.l (8th Cir. 1980); Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1260 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985);
Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 756 F. Supp. 1487, 1490 (E.D. Okla. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 989 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1993). As will be seen, there is a similarity between the ADEA
and the Equal Pay Act that supports the extension of the Equal Pay Act's strict liability analysis
to age discrimination cases.
13. See Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1215 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Equal Pay Act's "strict
liability" analysis to Title VII claims would "radically alter[' Title VII's burden of proof scheme");
Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 42 U. FLA. L. REv. 229, 304-05 (1990) (applying Equal Pay Act-type analysis
in ADEA cases "would seriously disrupt the burdens of proof in traditional disparate treatment
cases").
14. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981).
15. Id. at 977.
16. Id.
17. Jury trials have been available in ADEA cases since 1978. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982); Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
18. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 977.
19. Liquidated damages, in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages recovered, are
available in an ADEA action in which the statutory violation is found to have been "willful." 29
U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b).
20. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 977.
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In considering the appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that in order to

establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff was required
to prove: (1) his membership in the protected class; (2) his discharge;
(3) his qualifications for the position; and (4) his replacement by one
outside the protected class. 2' The court explained that under this test,
the plaintiff
is not required to introduce evidence of the employer's state
22

of mind.

The court concluded that because the aging process constantly causes
older employees to leave the labor market while younger ones enter, a
prima facie showing of age discrimination does not require the inference
of improper motive typically required in Title VII disparate treatment

cases. 23 The court also reasoned that because Congress had provided for

the "special" remedy of liquidated damages in cases involving "willful"
violations of the ADEA, 24 ordinary statutory remedies must be available
25
in cases involving "unintended" violations of the ADEA.
The plaintiff in Kelly had invoked both the disparate treatment theory
and the disparate impact theory, 26 and if the court merely had been
confirming that proof of a discriminatory motive is unnecessary in disparate impact cases, the decision would hardly be noteworthy. 27 The
prima facie case to which the court was referring when it concluded that
proof of a discriminatory motive is unnecessary, however, was applicable
in disparate treatment cases. 2 Thus, Kelly is properly regarded as a

21. Id. at 980. The Ninth Circuit subsequently relaxed these requirements, indicating that a
plaintiff may be able to establish a prima facie case "even when .. . replaced by someone within
the protected age class." Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981). The United
States Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of whether the identity of the plaintiff's replacement
is relevant to the prima facie case. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2758
n.l (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (Title VII case).
22. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980.
23. Id. (citing Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The court's reasoning in this regard is not entirely clear. See Maria Ziegler, Note, DisparateImpact
Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1045 n.29 (1984)
(describing Kelly as a "somewhat confused opinion"). Other courts have concluded that differences
between age discrimination and discrimination against Title VII's protected classes suggest that the
proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADEA should be
more stringent than that necessary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII. See, e.g., Marshall
v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b).
25. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980; cf. Alan A. Blakeboro, Allocation of Proof in ADEA Cases: A
Critique of the Prima Facie Case Approach, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 90, 101 n.71 (1980):
Because "willful" violations result in liquidated damages some lesser standard
of intent presumably is required for recovery of back wages. This level of intent
may be lower than the "discriminatory motive" required for a violation of Title
VII in disparate treatment cases.
26. See Kelly, 640 F.2d at 977, 980 n.9. The tactic is not uncommon. See, e.g., Maresco v.
Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Both the disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories can be invoked in a given case to establish ADEA liability, since they are simply
alternative doctrinal premises for a statutory violation."); Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709
F.2d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The plaintiff airline pilots alleged both discriminatory treatment
and disparate impact ...."),aff'd, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706
F.2d 111, 117 (3rd Cir.) ("the plaintiff in the instant case apparently has attempted to straddle
[the] two theories of discrimination"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
27. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
28. See Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980. "In discussing the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima

Winter 19941

ADEA DISPARATE

TREATMENT

disparate treatment case in which the court recognized the potential for
ADEA liability in the absence of proof of a discriminatory motive on
the part of the employer. 2 9
The Seventh Circuit quickly embraced the Kelly view in Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co.30 The plaintiff in Syvock was a
forty-five-year-old welder who had been laid off after approximately two
years of employment. 31 He contended that his employer had retained
younger, less-accomplished welders with poorer disciplinary records and
less seniority. 32 The plaintiff also argued that two younger welders who
had been laid off with him were recalled earlier despite having received
poorer performance ratings on their final evaluations. 33 The employer,
there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory
on the other hand, contended that
34
reasons for these distinctions.
After the jury found that the employer had willfully discriminated
against the plaintiff, the employer moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.35 The court upheld the jury's finding with respect to liability,
but granted the 37employer's motion on the issue of willfulness. 36 Both
parties appealed.

facie case, Kelly noted that it could be established via the McDonnell Douglas standard without
showing a state of mind .... McDonnell Douglas is a disparate treatment case." Maria Ziegler,
Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L.
REv. 1038, 1045 n.29 (1984).
The court's observation that the plaintiff had "introduced sufficient statistical evidence to establish
a prima facie case," Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980 n.9, does not undermine the conclusion that Kelly
should be regarded as a disparate treatment case. Statistical evidence may be used to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment as well as of disparate impact. See, e.g., Diaz v. American
Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages,
and Economics: What JudicialStandard?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 715, 744 (1990). See generally
Martin D. Schneiderman, The Law of Age Discrimination:DisparateTreatment and DisparateImpact,
AcE DISCRIMINATION 181, 196 n.8 (1982) ("The use of statistics to establish or support a prima
facie case of disparate treatment ... is to be distinguished from the use of statistics to attack a
facially neutral employment criterion as having a disparate impact on protected group employees ....
The court of appeals in Kelly .. . apparently ignores this distinction.").
It should be noted, however, that the natural progression of the aging process may make work
force age statistics less reliable indicators of discriminatory intent than are statistics pertaining to
other protected classes. See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1224 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Mark I. Schickman, The Strengths and Weaknesses of the
McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 1239, 1250 (1981).
29. Cf Maria Ziegler, Note, DisparateImpact Analysis and the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1038, 1045 n.29 (1984) ("In citing the McDonnell Douglas standard, Kelly
seems to say that an inference of intentional discrimination can be drawn without inferring bad
motive.").
30. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.,
860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988).
31. Id. at 152.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The defendant-employer asserted that Syvock was not a particularly good pipe fitter and
that he was less productive, industrious and versatile than some of his co-workers. Id.
35. Id. at 151.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the willfulness issue at some
length.3" Acknowledging that proof of a discriminatory motive is essential
in Title VII disparate treatment cases,3 9 the court observed that if proof
of a discriminatory motive is necessary in ADEA disparate treatment
cases, any ADEA violation premised on disparate treatment would result
in an award of liquidated damages. 4° Believing that a liquidated damages
award should require a greater showing of willfulness than a "nonwillful" violation of the ADEA, 41 the court concluded that it must be
an ADEA violation without proving the employer's
possible to establish
42
state of mind.

Despite its apparent acceptance by two circuit courts within a period
of a few months, the "strict liability" approach generated little additional
interest.43 The Sixth Circuit did cite Kelly and Syvock with approval in
Blackwell v. Sun Electric Corp.,44 however, noting that "Congress evidently intended that a plaintiff be'45able to prove age discrimination without
proving intent to discriminate.

Some of the indifference to the approach in Kelly and Syvock appears
to be attributable to an assumption that its adoption would render the
employer's motive irrelevant in ADEA disparate treatment cases. 46 However, the analysis in Kelly and Syvock may merely mean that it is the

38. Id. at 154-58.
39. Id. at 155 n.7.
40. Id. at 155 n.7 and 156 n.10.
41. Id. at 154.
42. Id. at 156 n.10. Syvock held that the standard for willfulness would be met if an employer
"knew or should have known" that its actions violated the ADEA. Id. at 156. Relying on McLaughlin
v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), in which the Supreme Court concluded that a similar
standard was inconsistent with the "knowledge or reckless disregard" standard approved in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. Ill (1985), the Seventh Circuit abandoned the Syvock
standard in Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, Syvock's
conclusion that "unconscious" discrimination violates the ADEA apparently continues to be the
law in the Seventh Circuit. See Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989).
43. Six years after Kelly and Syvock were decided one commentator observed that "No cases
since Syvock have found an unconscious violation in an individual employment decision." Rebecca
Marshall, Note, Bootstrapping A Malice Requirement Into ADEA Liquidated Damages Awards, 62
WASH. L. Rav. 551, 559-60 n.57 (1987).
44. 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 1183-84; see also Kneisley v. Hercules Inc., 577 F. Supp. 726, 737 (D. Del. 1983)
("Syvock's reasoning is internally sound and has been followed by other courts") (citing Blackwell).
46. See, e.g., Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1580 (N.D. Ala. 1983):
In Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), the
Seventh Circuit holds that Congress did not intend that liability for a violation of
A'DEA necessarily be predicated upon a showing of the defendant's state of mind ....
This Court cannot understand and disagrees with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning.
In a "disparate treatment" case, . . . McDonnell Douglas and Burdine require an
ultimate showing of an intent to discriminate, and that any articulated non-discriminatory reason necessarily is a pretext. How can a facially non-discriminatory
scheme be a pretext and yet there be no intent to discriminate?
See also Rebecca Marshall, Note, Bootstrapping A Malice Requirement Into ADEA Liquidated
Damage Awards, 62 WASH. L. REV. 551, 560 n.57 (1987) (concluding that the result suggested by
Syvock is "theoretically impossible" because "the essence of proof in these cases is an inquiry into
the employer's intent").

Winter 19941

ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT

employer, and not the employee, who bears the burden of proof on the
issue of intent. 7
Nonetheless, even that conclusion is contrary to traditional Title VII
disparate treatment analysis as it has evolved from the Supreme Court's
decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green" and Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine.49 McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
established a three-step test in which the plaintiff has the initial burden
0
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action." If
that burden is met, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove that
the legitimate reason offered by the employer was not its true reason,
but a pretext for discrimination . 2 While the burden of production shifts
to the employer under the second step of the test, the ultimate burden
of persuasion on the issue of the employer's discriminatory intent remains
plaintiff.53
with
Thethe
court
in Cowen v. StandardBrands, Inc. , 4 for example, concluded
that the analysis in Syvock was inconsistent with the McDonnell Douglas!
Burdine test, and declined to follow it. 55 The court did note, however,
' 5 6 that have prompted
that the ADEA provides for "affirmative defenses
courts to shift to the employer the burden not only of articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, but the burden of
proof on that issue.5 7 Thus, although the Cowen court declined to adopt
Syvock's reasoning,5 it implicitly suggested a basis for adopting a "strict
liability" approach to ADEA disparate treatment liability that had not
been discussed in Syvock itself.
III. THE MERITS OF APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY
ANALYSIS IN ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
The Analogy Between The ADEA And The Equal Pay Act
The ADEA provision invoked as an affirmative defense in Cowen
permits employers to differentiate between individuals based on "rea-

A.

47. This interpretation is suggested by a passage in Syvock in which the court indicated that
an employer should be liable if its explanation of its conduct is not believed, even if its actions
are not found to have been consciously discriminatory. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc.,
665 F.2d 149, 157 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.,
860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988).
48. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
49. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
50. Id. at 252-53.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id.
53. Id.; White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
54. 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
55. Id. at 1580.
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1988).
57. Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1579.
58. !d. at 1580.
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sonable factors other than age." 5 9 That provision, commonly referred to
as the "RFOA exception," is one of four statutory exceptions to the
ADEA's general prohibition of age discrimination 0 There is no comparable provision in Title VII; 6 1 the RFOA exception instead mirrors a
provision in the Equal Pay Act 62 that allows employers to make distinctions
in pay if the difference is based on any factor "other than sex."6' 3
The Equal Pay Act provision is unquestionably an affirmative defense
upon which the employer bears the burden of proof." Once the plaintiff
establishes a pay distinction between similarly-situated males and females,
the employer has the burden of proving that the wage disparity was

attributable to a factor other than sex. 65 Because the risk of non-persuasion

rests with the employer on the ultimate issue of liability, 6 the Equal Pay
67

Act is frequently characterized as a strict liability statute.

The fact that the RFOA exception appears to have been
after the Equal Pay Act provisions suggests that the Equal
strict liability approach may be appropriate in cases arising
ADEA as well. 69 Under that view, the RFOA exception would

patterned
Pay Act's
under the
be treated

59. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0; see generally Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d Ill,
116 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
61. See Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Howard
Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable
Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 191, 194 (1986).
The "business necessity" defense occasionally is characterized as the RFOA exception's closest
analogue in Title VII. See Cannistra v. FAA, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1621, 1623 n.4
(D.D.C. 1979); cf 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (1993); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and
the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 837, 845 n.32 (1982). However, the two defenses
generally have been treated somewhat differently. See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination,
Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 715, 730 n.70
(1990); BARBARA L. Scm.LI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRUmNATIoN LAW 505 n. 162 (2d ed.
1983).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
64. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
65. Id. at 196-97; Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989). The employer's burden
has been described as a "heavy" one. Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1986);
Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 651 n.120 (1983).
66. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
67. See supra note 12.
68. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 215; Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse
Impact Doctrine to ADEA, 10 EMPLOYEE Rpt. L.J. 437, 446 (1985); Mack A. Player, Title VII
Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Is a TransplantAppropriate?,
14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1261, 1280 (1983); Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REv. 621,
651 n.120 (1983); Martin D. Schneiderman, The Law of Age Discrimination: Disparate Treatment
and Disparate Impact, AGE DIscRImmNATIoN 181, 183 (1982).
69. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 195. See also Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the parallel structure of the ADEA
... (should] yield the same result" as the Equal Pay Act).
Professor Steven Kaminshine has argued that there is nothing in the legislative history of the
ADEA to indicate that Congress placed "conscious reliance" upon the Equal Pay Act provision
when drafting the RFOA exception. Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 304. While that is true, Professor
Kaminshine's suggestion that Congress' silence demonstrates that the similarity between the two
provisions is merely coincidental appears to represent the extreme minority view. A particularly
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as an affirmative defense 0 requiring the employer to prove the absence
of a causal connection between the plaintiff's age and its adverse employment action. 7' Not only does the structure of the ADEA support
that interpretation, 7 but the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
the exception as an affirmative defense in
appears to have characterized
73
its interpretive regulations.

Despite the significant implications of the analogy between the RFOA
exception and the Equal Pay Act provision for both disparate treatment
and disparate impact analysis,7 4 it has received surprisingly little attention.
It occasionally has been relied upon, however, to support the argument
71
that disparate impact analysis ought not to apply in ADEA cases.
The argument is based primarily upon the decision in County of
Washington v. Gunther,76 where the Supreme Court suggested that the
convincing rebuttal to Professor Kaminshine's argument, focusing upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) and the close relationship of both the Equal Pay Act
and the ADEA to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1988), appears in an article by Professor Howard Eglit. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 194-95. Professor
Eglit concludes that what little legislative history there is on the issue supports the conclusion that
the RFOA exception, like the Equal Pay Act provision, was intended to be an affirmative defense.
See id.at 193-94.
70. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 195 ("the similarity in language between the [Equal Pay Act]
provision and the ... RFOA exception .. . support[s] the conclusion that just as the . . . ' factor
other than sex' exception in the [Equal Pay Act] imposes upon the defendant the burden of proof,
the RFOA exception .. . imposes a comparable burden on ADEA defendants").
71. See Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc.:
[I]nasmuch as [the] ADEA expressly provides for affirmative defenses (something
Title VII does not provide) when an employer affirmatively interposes such a statutory
defense, the employer undertakes not only the burden of articulatinga legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision as in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,
but undertakes the burden of persuasion or of proof as to the statutory reason ....
572 F. Supp. 1576, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1983); cf. Denny v. Westfield State College, 669 F. Supp.
1146, 1156 (D. Mass. 1987) ("the very notion of an 'affirmative defense' strongly suggests that
...the party claiming its benefit has the burden .. .of persuading the trier of fact .. . that the
party should prevail on the defense").
72. See Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Eglit, supra note 61, at 196, 203.
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e) (1993) ("When the exception of 'a reasonable factor other than age'
is raised against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears the burden of
showing that the 'reasonable factor other than age' exists factually."). Compare Charles A. Sullivan
& Michael J. Zimmer, Proving a VKolation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 803, 853 (1987) ("the EEOC Interpretive Rules place the burden of
proving the reasonable factors exception . . . on the employer") with Eglit, supra note 61, at 224
n.295 (the EEOC's interpretation "while not serving to impose a burden of proof, does require
factual veracity and so departs from the burden imposed by [Burdine]"). Although the EEOC's
interpretation is not binding on the courts, it is entitled to considerable deference. Criswell v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400
(1985); Eglit, supra note 61, at 192.
74. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 304-05 (interpreting the RFOA exception in the same
manner as the Equal Pay Act exception would "oust disparate impact" and "seriously disrupt the
burdens of proof in traditional disparate treatment cases").
75. Compare EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (the
analogy does not preclude the extension of disparate impact theory to ADEA cases) with Peter H.
Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'y 715, 731-32 (1990) (the analogy does preclude the use of disparate impact theory in
ADEA cases). See Eglit, supra note 61, at 199-203, 215-16, for an excellent discussion of the
argument.
76. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Gunther involved the "Bennett Amendment" to Title VII, which appears
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"factor other than sex" defense limits the applicability of the Equal Pay

Act to cases involving intentional discrimination. 77 In Metz v. Transit
a
Mix, Inc. ,7 Judge Frank Easterbrook cited Gunther in support of his
conclusion that disparate impact analysis should not be extended to ADEA
79

cases.

In contrast to Judge Easterbrook's analysis, however, the court

0 concluded
in E.E. 0. C. v. Governor Mifflin School DistrictI
that because
the language of the Equal Pay Act provision and that of the RFOA
exception are not identical, the analogy between the two provisions does
not preclude the use of disparate impact theory in ADEA cases. 8s
Judge Easterbrook's reasoning clearly supports interpreting the RFOA

exception as an affirmative defense.

2

And, although the Governor Mifflin

court observed that the RFOA exception and the Equal Pay Act provision

are not identical,8 3 its conclusion that the ADEA is not limited to cases
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000h (1981). By permitting employers to differentiate on the basis of
sex in the payment of wages without violating Title VII if the differentiation is authorized by the
Equal Pay Act, the Bennett Amendment effectively incorporates into Title VII the Equal Pay Act's
"factor other than sex" affirmative defense. See EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp.
734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
77. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170; see also Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710-11 n.20
(1978).
78. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The majority in Metz did not specifically disagree
with Judge Easterbrook's conclusion. See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and
Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARY. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 715, 745 n.138 (1990) (although
"both the majority opinion and the dissent [inMetz] discuss .. .disparate impact," the majority's
holding "is based on !the disparate treatment standard"). While observing that Judge Easterbrook
had failed "to come to grips with the specific facts" of the case, the Metz majority acknowledged
that he had presented "a number of interesting insights into the nature of age discrimination."
Metz, 828 F.2d at 1208.
80. 623 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
81. Id. at 740.
82. Judge Easterbrook characterized the structure of the RFOA exception and the Equal Pay
Act provision as "parallel" and "identical," and suggested that they should "yield the same result."
Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220; cf. Eglit, supra note 61, at 195 ("the similarity in language between the
EPA provision and the ... RFOA exception .. .support[s] the conclusion that just as the EPA's
'factor other than sex' exception .. .imposes upon the defendant the burden of proof, the RFOA
exception ... imposes a comparable burden on ADEA defendants").
83. The court's perception of the difference between the two provisions is not critical to the
present analysis, but was stated as follows:
The Equal Pay Act excludes all pay differentiations based on "any factor other
than sex" whereas the ADEA excludes actions based on "reasonable factors other
than age." Although this may be a small difference, the language in the ADEA
requires that a court evaluate the proffered explanations for an action to determine
whether the non-age bases are "reasonable." The Equal Pay Act, on the other
hand, involves an absolute defense.
Governor Mifflin, 623 F. Supp. at 740.
According to the Governor Mifflin court, this difference means that an ADEA plaintiff faced
with an RFOA defense would have an opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's explanation
for its actions was pretextual, while an Equal Pay Act plaintiff would have no similar opportunity.
Id. However, other courts have indicated that an employer will be liable under the Equal Pay Act
if its reliance on a "factor other than sex" is found to be pretextual. See, e.g., Plemer v. ParsonsGilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136-37 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1983).
Moreover, because the Supreme Court in Gunther stated that the "factor other than sex" upon
which the employer in an Equal Pay Act case may rely must be "bona fide," Gunther, 452 U.S.
at 170, one commentator has concluded that "the insertion of the word 'reasonable' in the ADEA
does not fundamentally change its impact," and that it is difficult to believe "that the importation
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of intentional discrimination" is consistent with extending the Equal Pay
Act's strict liability approach to ADEA disparate treatment cases.
In addition, the RFOA exception was treated as an affirmative defense
in Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc. ,5 the only officially-reported disparate
86
treatment case in which reference to the analogy has been made. 7 In

Criswell, the Ninth Circuit cited Corning Glass Works v. Brennan in

support of its conclusion that the RFOA exception is an affirmative
defense.88 The court in Criswell parenthetically described Corning Glass
on an
Works as standing for the proposition that a defendant relying
89
exception to the FLSA has the burden of proving the exception. Because
the FLSA exception at issue in Corning Glass Works was the "factor
9
other than sex" provision of the Equal Pay Act, 0 it is apparent that
the Criswell court was relying by analogy upon the Supreme Court's
characterization of the Equal Pay Act provision as an affirmative defense
9
to arrive at a similar interpretation of the ADEA's RFOA exception. '
Professor Mack Player, on the other hand, has argued against treating
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in the disparate treatment
context .92 He suggests that any appeal to the analogy between the RFOA
exception and the Equal Pay Act provision is "superficial" because the
plaintiff in an Equal Pay Act case need not offer evidence of the
employer's motive in order to establish a prima facie93 case, while such
evidence is critical in ADEA disparate treatment cases. That observation
obviously begs the question, however, and therefore adds little to an
analysis of the issue. 94

into the ADEA of an affirmative defense from the Equal Pay Act, which the Supreme Court implies
shuts off the [disparate impact] approach, has been virtually nullified by the mere addition of the
adjective 'reasonable."' Martin D. Schneiderman, The Law of Age Discrimination:Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact, AGE DiscRMINATION 181, 212 & n.14 (1982).
84. See Governor Mifflin, 623 F. Supp. at 740.
85. 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
86. Nearly a decade before Criswell was decided, the analogy also provided the basis for
interpreting the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in an "unofficially" published oral
opinion. Hodgson v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 744 (N.D. W.Va.
1974).
87. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
88. Criswell, 709 F.2d at 552-53.
89. Id. at 553.
90. The Equal Pay Act's "factor other than sex" exception is a part of the FLSA. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1620.1 (1991); Hill v. J.C. Penney Co., 688 F.2d 370, 372 n.l (5th Cir. 1982); Peter H. Harris,
Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 715, 731 (1990).
91. Cf. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 1989) ("In Corning Glass Works,
the Court concluded that the Equal Pay Act defenses were affirmative defenses because Fair Labor
Standards Act exemptions traditionally have been treated as affirmative defenses on which employers
bore the burden of proof.").
92. Mack A. Player, Proofof DisparateTreatment Under the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 651 n.120 (1983). The analogy also
is discussed briefly, and equivocally, in Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, Proving a Violation
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 852-53
(1987).
93. Player, supra note 92, at 651 n.120.
94. Not only was Professor Player's discussion of the issue limited to a single footnote in an
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B.

Professor Eglit's "Bifurcated" Interpretation Of The RFOA
Exception
A far more extensive discussion of the analogy's impact upon disparate
treatment analysis appears in an impressive article by Professor Howard
Eglit. 95 Professor Eglit acknowledges that the RFOA exception's similarity
to the Equal Pay Act's "factor other than sex" provision militates in
favor of treating the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense.9 He
nevertheless advocates a "bifurcated" 9 7 or "variable" 98 interpretation of
the ADEA in which the RFOA exception, while treated as an affirmative
defense in other contexts, would not be treated as an affirmative defense
in individual disparate treatment cases grounded on circumstantial evidence. 99 Professor Eglit acknowledges that such cases account for the
"great majority of ADEA decisions."1' t
Professor Eglit's proposal is essentially an original one.' 0 It reflects
his concern that treating the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense
in all disparate treatment cases would undermine the case law that has
02
applied McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1
and Texas Department of
0
3
Community Affairs v. Burdine' in the ADEA context.' °4

article discussing ADEA disparate treatment analysis, but he apparently advocates interpreting the
RFOA exception in the same manner as the Equal Pay Act provision in the disparate impact context.
Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1261, 1279-83 (1983). See Eglit, supra note 61,
at 157-58 n.10 (discussing the apparent inconsistency in Professor Player's interpretations of the
exception).
95. Eglit, supra note 61.
96. See id. at 179 n. 112, 194-95, 199-203. He does argue, however, that the broader reach of
the RFOA exception provides some relief from the "analogical pressure" exerted by the Equal Pay
Act provision, and may afford a basis for interpreting the provisions differently. Id. at 209.
97. Id. at 160.
98. Id. at 225.
99. Id. at 160, 219, 226.
100. Id. at 198. It is not entirely clear how Professor Eglit's approach would apply in disparate
treatment cases involving a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, see, e.g., La Montagne
v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409-1415 (7th Cir. 1984), although it appears
that he would treat the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in such cases. See Eglit, supra
note 61, at 224.
101. Although Professor Eglit indicates that his approach merely gives "formal name to what in
effect already has been occurring in practice," Eglit, supra note 61, at 219, there actually has been
only one case, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1975), in which a court approved
a bifurcated interpretation of the RFOA exception, and (as Professor Eglit observes) it did so
without explanation or analysis. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 192. There also appears to have been
no direct academic support for his interpretation, see id. at 157-58 n.10, although Professors Charles
Sullivan and Michael Zimmer have since advocated interpreting the ADEA's closely-related "good
cause" exception in a similar manner. Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J.Zimmer, Proving a Violation
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 851-52
(1987). See generally Eglit, supra note 61, at 179 n.112 ("Because the good cause defense is simply
one particular type of reasonable factor other than age, the ensuing analysis-which identifies the
RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in some, but not all, settings-should equally apply to
the good cause provision.").
102. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
103. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
104. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 180, 198-99. See generally St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 2757 (1993) (Souter, J.,dissenting) (observing that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
approach "has gained wide acceptance, not only in cases alleging discrimination on the basis of
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Professor Eglit does not argue that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
05
approach necessarily should have been extended to the ADEA.' Nonetheless, the fact that so many courts have done so mandates "that only
a particularly compelling reason could justify the decision's rejection
now.' 0 6 In his opinion, the arguments for treating the RFOA exception
as an affirmative defense, while strong,' °7 are not sufficiently compelling
to support such a rejection.108
Professor Eglit's desire to avoid undermining existing precedent is not
without merit. 0 9 It is perhaps best illustrated by the decision in Cowen

,race, color, religion, sex, or national origin' under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, but also in
similar cases, such as those alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967").
Professor Eglit also identifies a second, closely-related reason for rejecting an interpretation of
the RFOA as an affirmative defense that also is premised on a concern for preserving existing case
law:
[T]he RFOA exception's construction as an affirmative defense also creates the
potential for diluting the protection afforded ADEA plaintiffs by other bodies of
case law. This is because arguably a reading of the exception as an affirmative
defense confirms the inaptitude, for example, of Title VII disparate impact doctrine
and so precludes imposition on defendants of the too-rigorous (according to this
argument) business necessity justification. A lesser burden, peculiar to the RFOA
defense, would enhance the ability of defendants to prevail in situations in which,
were they required to prove business necessity or job-relatedness, they well might
fail.
Eglit, supra note 61, at 198.
105. Professor Eglit states:
Admittedly, the repudiation of Burdine in the ADEA context would not directly
contradict Supreme Court case law, inasmuch as the Court has yet to explicitly
endorse the applicability of Burdine to the age statute. Moreover, apart from this
judicial silence on the matter, it could be argued that Burdine indeed should be
deemed inapposite because it was devised in the context of Title VII. While in
Lorillard v. Pons the Court noted that the "prohibitions of the ADEA were derived
in haec verba from Title VII," this observation actually is somewhat misleading.
The ADEA's prohibitions are cabined by the RFOA defense, which is not contained
at all in Title VII, save for the similar (but not identical) "factor other than sex"
[Equal Pay Act] defense which is incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett
Amendment, and which is applicable only to gender-based compensation differentiations. Thus, the analogical pressure of Burdine is not so heavy as the Lorillard
dictum might suggest.
Eglit, supra note 61, at 203 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 209.
107. See id. at 196 (noting that "the affirmative defense reading of the RFOA provision is the
better supported interpretation").
108. Id. at 209.
109. However, his conclusion that employers would be particularly resistant to abandoning McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, see id. at 198-99, may not be universally shared. Cf. Jeffrey L. Liddle,
Disparate Treatment Claims under ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
5 EMPLOYE REL. L.J. 549, 549 (1979) ("It is no secret that the McDonnell Douglas v. Green

decision causes confusion and generates animosity from Title VII defendants and their attorneys .... "). Even under the McDonnell Douglas approach, after all, plaintiffs may prevail in at
least some jurisdictions without establishing that the employer had a discriminatory motive. See La
Montagne v. American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (7th Cir. 1984) (the
"special virtue" of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach is that it "allows victims of age
discrimination to prevail without presenting any evidence that age was a determining factor in the
employer's motivation"). That fact has presented considerable difficulty for employers. See Peter H.
Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L.

& PUB. POL'Y 715, 724 (1990) ("Although an employer's 'true' motives may be economic, when
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V. Standard Brands, Inc. ,"° in which the court rejected the analysis of
Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing Co., Inc." The Cowen court
instead chose to apply the precedent of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine," 2
despite the court's apparent belief that the extension of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine approach to the ADEA had been a mistake." 3
Nevertheless, Professor Eglit acknowledges that the general acceptance
of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in ADEA cases does not foreclose

an alternative approach. 1 4 He also admits that some courts already treat

the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in all situations," 5 and

that such an interpretation
is consistent with the language and structure
6

of the ADEA.1
Given this split of authority," 7 either acceptance or rejection of the
view that the RFOA exception should be treated as an affirmative defense
would be contrary to an existing body of precedent." 8 Because Professor
Eglit's "intermediate" approach would not entirely avoid the problem," 9
one reasonably might conclude that the relevant inquiry is not whether
interpreting the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense would undermine established case law, but which of two competing interpretations
of the exception ought to prevail. When the issue is framed in that

courts put circumstantial evidence through the [McDonnell Douglas] disparate treatment machine,
they sometimes infer that discriminatory motives are behind the employer's actions.") (citing as an
example Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing, 728 F.2d 976
(1984)).
110. 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
111. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc.,
860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1580.
113. Id. at 1580-81.
114. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 203 & n.235.
115. See, e.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 372
(D. Md. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); EEOC v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 489 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (D. Minn. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th
Cir. 1981). See generally Eglit, supra note 61, at 157, 180, 188.
116. See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 61, at 196 (noting that "the affirmative defense reading of the
RFOA provision is the better supported interpretation," and that the "few contrary decisions" are
"either poorly reasoned, or devoid of any analysis whatsoever"); id. at 203 (observing that "because
the RFOA defense applies in all the ADEA settings ... Burdine's applicability would seem to be
negated across the range of factual contexts in which the ADEA applies").
117. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544
(9th Cir. 1983) to resolve the conflict, but subsequently found it unnecessary to do so. Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 408 n.10 (1985). See generally Eglit, supra note 61, at
157 ("The Criswell Court's failure to reach this issue left standing a split among the courts.").
118. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 159 ("both polar positions-that the exception does, and that
it does not, constitute an affirmative defense-have the potential for . . . the undermining of
significant, albeit differing, bodies of ADEA case law"); see also id. at 180, 196.
119. Professor Eglit concedes that his approach would not leave existing case law "entirely
untouched," since it would undermine cases such as Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) in which courts have construed
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense "without caveat." Eglit, supra note 61, at 219-20
n.277.

Winter 1994]

ADEA DISPARATE TREATMENT

fashion, it is by no means clear that the ADEA case law embracing
20
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine should be preserved.
The Argument For Preserving McDonnell Douglas Is Unpersuasive
The principal policy argument in favor of preserving McDonnell Douglas, actually advanced somewhat more forcefully by Professor Steven
Kaminshine than by Professor Eglit, 12' appears to be that interpreting
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense would provide victims of
age discrimination with greater protection than is available to victims of
22
discrimination based on race or sex,' even though race and sex discrimination often are characterized as more "pernicious" evils than age
discrimination. 123 This argument is subject to criticism on several grounds.
For one thing, essentially the same argument originally prompted a number
cases.'2
of courts to conclude that jury trials were unavailable in ADEA
The Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded; it ultimately held that
jury trials are available in ADEA cases even though (at the125time) they
generally were thought to be unavailable in Title VII cases.
More fundamentally, however, it is not clear that Professor Eglit fully
subscribes to the view that age discrimination is less pernicious than race
or sex discrimination.12 For example, he is somewhat critical of Professor
Blumrosen's reasoning in reaching that conclusion, observing that Professor Blumrosen "hardly gives due recognition to the nature of ageC.

120. Professor Eglit notes that "neither side of the judicial division has put forth a persuasive
dispositive justification for reading the RFOA language in one way or the other." Eglit, supra,
note 61, at 193. He also states that only the court in Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d
544 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), which interpreted the RFOA
exception as an affirmative defense, showed "any appreciation of the doctrinal problems generated
by ... the two polar positions," although he concludes that it too was "unable to work out a
satisfactory solution." Eglit, supra note 61, at 192-93, 225.
121. Compare Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 305 with Eglit, supra note 61, at 203-05.
122. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 305; Eglit, supra note 61, at 204.
123. Eglit, supra note 61, at 211; see also Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 273
(7th Cir. 1986) ("Congress has historically viewed the problems addressed by Title VII, racial,
sexual, and religious discrimination, to be more serious than the problem of age discrimination."),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); cf. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728
and n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing, but ultimately rejecting, the view that age discrimination is
of a "less invidious nature" than race and sex discrimination), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
124. See, e.g., Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 221-22 (D. Colo. 1977)
("[I]t would be anomalous to hold that a jury trial is required to remedy age discrimination in
employment, but not to remedy discrimination in employment based on race, sex, national origin,
and religion."); Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (quoting
Hannon with approval).
125. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978).
126. Cf. Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Discrimination
based on age-what some people call 'age-ism'---can be as great an evil in our society as discrimination
based on race or religion or any other characteristic which ignores a person's unique status as an
individual and treats him or her as a member of some arbitrarily-defined group.") (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849); Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Age discrimination, while often
more subtle than race or sex discrimination, is equally pernicious."), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ism.' 1 27 He also alludes to the potential anomaly that may result from
concluding that age discrimination is less pernicious than sex discrimination
because sex was included as a protected classification in Title VII only
after its inclusion was suggested by opponents of the legislation as a
"last-minute legislative ploy" to make the legislation appear ridiculous. 28
Finally, Professor Eglit observes that there is but a single statement in
the ADEA's legislative history suggesting that Congress viewed age discrimination as being less insidious than race discrimination, 29 although
he does conclude that it may be legitimate to draw that inference, 30 and
observes that "most would agree that racism is the most odious of
biases."'' In any event, Professor Eglit appears to view the question as
13 2
an open one.
Moreover, the assertion that interpreting the RFOA exception as an
affirmative defense would result in ADEA plaintiffs receiving more favorable treatment than Title VII claimants is only partially correct. For
example, the affirmative defense interpretation would merely equate the
treatment of age discrimination claimants with that of victims of sex
discrimination in compensation in those jurisdictions that apply Equal
Pay Act analysis in Title VII cases involving sex-based wage discrimination.' 33

127. Eglit, supra note 61, at 212 n.257.
128. Id.; see also Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L.
REV. 431, 441 (1966) (Amendment including sex as a protected Title VII classification was offered
"in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery."). But cf. Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got Into Title VII:
Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 183 (1991) (concluding
that "[alithough the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment became law in a manner
atypical of major legislation, it was not as thoughtless, or as devious, as has generally been assumed").
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAWS 278-79 (1992):
Title VII [is] a statute deriving its moral force from the consensus on the question
of race. Sex discrimination was almost an afterthought. The statutory prohibition
was added to Title VII while the bill was on the floor of the House of Representatives
as a ploy by the bill's opponents, who hoped to make the entire bill unpalatable
to some of its wavering supporters....
In political terms, the opponents of the Civil Rights Act made a fatal miscalculation:
the dare was taken up, and the statute passed with its broader coverage. But the
legislative maneuvers show at the very least the wholly different social histories
that lie behind the two prohibitions. Whatever the course and extent of sexual
inequality in this country, women were never slaves, and they have never been
subjected to invidious discrimination in public accommodations.
129. Eglit, supra, note 61 at 204 n.236 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (1967) (statement of Rep.
Burke)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 204. But cf. Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
("Given the conclusory statements of Representatives Burke and Dent, the inference that 'Congress
viewed age discrimination as a unique form of employment discrimination' ... is a reasonable one.
However, it does not follow that the reasons, if any, for these statements are compelling.") (quoting
Naton v. Bank of Cal., 72 F.R.D. 550, 554-55 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
132. See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 61, at 212 n.257 ("accepting for the moment [the] view that
race and sex discrimination are more pernicious evils") (emphasis added).
133. See generally Dragon v. Rhode Island, Dep't of MHRH, 936 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1991):
Some courts have held that in an Equal Pay Act case the defendant bears the
burden of proving the existence of a reason "other than sex" for the pay differential,
while in a comparable Title VII case, the plaintiff (once the defendant presents
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In addition, reading the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense
13 4
would tend to confirm the view, already prevalent among commentators,
35
that it is inappropriate to extend disparate impact analysis to the ADEA.'
Thus, shifting to the employer the burden of proving lack of a discriminatory intent may actually create an intermediate position-a kind of
tertium quid-between traditional Title VII disparate treatment analysis,
36
in which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue of intent,
and Title VII disparate impact analysis, in which the employer may be
liable even if it proves that it lacked a discriminatory motive.'" Thus,
as Professor Eglit himself notes, interpreting the RFOA exception as an
affirmative defense would benefit plaintiffs in disparate treatment cases,
but to the extent that it "confirms the inaptitude ... of Title VII
disparate impact doctrine," it "would enhance the ability of defendants
to prevail."' 3 8

Finally, ADEA claimants clearly have been treated more favorably than
Title VII claimants in several respects. 3 9 Since 1978, for example, the
evidence of such a reason) bears the burden of "disproving" the non-sex-related
reason, or, in other words, she continues to bear the burden of proving that sex
caused the difference. Other cases, however, have held that, when Equal Pay Act
circumstances are involved, the normal Title VII burden of proof rules change and
the defendant (as in an Equal Pay Act case) bears the relevant burden of proof.
(citations omitted).
134. See Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 497 A.2d 199, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985) cert. denied, 508 A.2d 212, and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). ("[A]cademics have
generally criticized the view that a disparate impact theory should be used in age discrimination
cases."); Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What JudicialStandard?,
13 HAxv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 715, 729 n.60 (1990) ("The majority of published academic opinion
argues against the adoption of disparate impact theory under ADEA.").
135. See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting);
Eglit, supra note 61 at 198; Donald R. Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact Doctrine
to ADEA, 10 EmPLOYEE REL. L.J. 437, 451-52 (1984); Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination
and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STA. L. REV. 837 (1982); see also E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1983) ("[I1n order to insure that employers were permitted to use neutral
the Act provided that certain otherwise prohibited
criteria not directly dependent on age ...
where the differentiation is based on reasonable
employment practices would not be unlawful ...
factors other than age."').
136. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
137. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate
Treatment Under the Age Discrimination In Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme,
17 GA. L. REv. 621, 624 (1983); Eglit, supra note 61 at 166.
138. Eglit, supra note 61, at 198. It should be noted, however, that Professor Eglit is not convinced
that interpreting the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense precludes the use of disparate impact
analysis in ADEA cases. See generally id. at 210-17. Indeed, he specifically advocates interpreting
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense in the disparate impact context. Id. at 222-23.
139. See, e.g., Spanier v. Morrison's Management Serv., Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 n.l (l1th Cir.
1987) (Hill, J., concurring) ("[P]ersons discriminated against on account of age have a better remedy,
by virtue of § 626(b) of the ADEA, than those discriminated against on account of race, sex or
religion who seek relief under [Title VII]."); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (observing that while Title VII is limited to equitable remedies,
both the language and the legislative history of the ADEA make it clear that ADEA claimants may
seek both legal and equitable relief); Eglit, supra note 61, at 204 (acknowledging that the ADEA
"in some respects does treat age discrimination victims more favorably than Title VII protects its
favored classes"). But cf. Cunningham v. Central Beverage, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Tex.
1980) (observing that Title VII plaintiffs are "accorded more favorable substantive and procedural
benefits" than ADEA plaintiffs because "[tihe discrimination suffered by the aged is different from
that suffered by females or blacks").
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ADEA has provided for jury trials' 40 which, prior to the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,14 generally were considered to be unavailable
under Title VII. 142 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991143 amended the
ADEA to more closely equate its administrative procedures with those
of Title VII, the ADEA, unlike Title VII, permits plaintiffs to file suit
without first obtaining the EEOC's permission.'" The ADEA also provides
for the recovery of liquidated damages 145 which continue to be unavailable
under Title VII. 1' These differences obviously suggest that, at least in
some respects, Congress did intend to treat ADEA claimants more fa47
vorably than Title VII claimants.'
Professor Eglit acknowledges this point, but is not persuaded that the
RFOA exception fits the pattern. He states:
While in fact the ADEA in some respects does treat age discrimination
victims more favorably than Title VII protects its favored classes,
each of the advantages accorded the ADEA plaintiffs-the opportunity
to secure liquidated damages awards, the availability of jury trials,
and the ability to file suit without awaiting administrative permission
-is explicitly prescribed. The RFOA exception is a far more ambiguous, and therefore unconvincing, basis for inferring Congressional
intent to extend to age discrimination claimants considerably greater
protection than is afforded to grievants under Title VII. .... 148
One problem with this analysis is that the availability of jury trials
was not explicitly prescribed by the ADEA until after the Supreme Court
held that jury trials were available in Lorillard v. Pons.149 One certainly

140. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982).
141. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991).
142. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979); see also Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83, 84-85 (D.D.C.
1991) (declining to apply the 1991 Civil Rights Act's provision for jury trials retroactively), appeal
dismissed, 976 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1992).
143. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991). See generally Thomas J. Piskorski
& Michael A. Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Overview and Analysis, 8 LAB. LAW. 9, 15
& n.37 (1992); LEx K. LARSON, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 34-35 (1992).
144. See Turgeon v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
933, 935 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 72 F.R.D. 550, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Eglit,
supra note 61, at 205-06 n.239. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
146. See EEOC v. Independent Stave Co., 754 F. Supp. 713, 721 n.9 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Merkel
v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 148 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
147. See, e.g., Alan A. Blakeboro, Allocation of Proofin ADEA Cases: A Critique of the Prima
Facie Case Approach, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 90, 101 (1980) ("The legislative history of the two acts
does not indicate any intent to grant less protection to the aged than to the groups protected by
Title VII. In fact, by incorporating the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
into the ADEA, Congress has granted ADEA plaintiffs more protection .... "). But cf. Spanier
v. Morrison's Management Serv., Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 & n.l (11th Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring)
(suggesting that while persons discriminated against on account of age are treated more favorably
than those discriminated against on account of race or sex, that is unlikely to have been what
Congress intended).
148. Eglit, supra note 61, at 204-05.
149. 434 U.S. 575 (1978); see, e.g., Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 218
(D. Colo. 1977) ("Neither the terms of the ADEA nor its legislative history express or imply any
Congressional intent to have ADEA actions tried by a jury.").
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could argue that the statutory provisions that prompted the Supreme
Court's holding that jury trials are available under the ADEA'50 were
no less ambiguous an indication of Congress' intent to provide more
favorable treatment to ADEA claimants than was the express inclusion
of the RFOA exception in the ADEA.' 5'
The fact that the RFOA exception treats ADEA claimants more favorably may reflect both Congressional intent to improve upon Title
VII's remedial scheme' 5 2 and a change in the political climate occurring
between Title VII's enactment and the ADEA's enactment." 3 If so, then
there is nothing particularly "anomalous' '51 4 about an interpretation of
the RFOA exception55 that treats ADEA claimants more favorably than
Title VII claimants.
Indeed, Professor Eglit himself notes that even if race and sex discrimination are more pernicious than age discrimination, it does not
follow that an ADEA plaintiff should receive less protection than a Title
VII claimant, because "not all evils need be on the same plane in order
to muster equally vigorous statutory assaults."'5 Moreover, there undoubtedly may be legitimate reasons for subjecting an evil that is5 perceived
7
to be "less pernicious" to a more vigorous statutory assault.

150. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577-85.
151. Cf. Hannon, 427 F. Supp. at 218-22; Travers v. Coming Glass Works, 76 F.R.D. 431, 43436 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
152. In Lorillard, for example, the court noted that Congress had considered and rejected several
alternatives in enacting the ADEA, including the possibility of patterning the ADEA entirely upon
Title VII, and observed that "[t]he bill that was ultimately enacted is something of a hybrid,
reflecting, on the one hand, Congress' desire to use an existing statutory scheme ...and, on the
other hand, its dissatisfaction with some elements of each of the preexisting schemes." Lorillard,
434 U.S. at 578. But cf. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 380, 381 (1976) ("Whether the decision to administer the ADEA and Title VII separately was
...

intended to reflect differences in the degree of protection to be afforded ... is ... difficult

to discern.").
153. See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial
Standard?, 13 HARv. J.L. & Pun. PoL'Y 715, 730 n.66 (1990) ("[O]ne of the principal sponsors
of ADEA had wanted to amend Title VII at the time of its enactment to include age as one of
the protected categories. The senator apparently withheld the amendment out of fear that it would
'jeopardize' the passage of the Civil Rights Act."); Maria Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1053 n.64 (1984) ("Some
members of Congress simply did not understand or believe in the magnitude of the age-discrimination
problem in 1964."); RIcHARD A. EpsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AoAMNsT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2 (1992) ("When the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, there was little, if
any, public sentiment to regulate discrimination on the basis of either age or handicap. But within
a matter of a few years, protection against these forms of discrimination by analogy and extension
became a dominant theme within our legal culture.").
154. The term is used by both Professor Kaminshine and Professor Eglit. See Kaminshine, supra
note 13 at 305; Eglit, supra note 61, at 204.
155. But cf. Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 273 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that
it would be "anomalous" to interpret the ADEA in a manner more faVorable to employees than
Title VII notwithstanding the fact that "Congress enacted Title VII first"), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
940 (1987).
156. Eglit, supra note 61, at 212 n.257. Cf. Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp.
715, 728 & n.15 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (rejecting the view that "the less invidious nature of age discrimination as opposed to race and sex discrimination militates against shifting as heavy a burden
onto the shoulders of ADEA defendants as Title VII defendants must bear"), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
157. See generally Cunningham v. Central Beverage, Inc., 486 F. Supp 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1980):
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In short, the argument that courts should avoid interpreting the RFOA
exception in a manner that would result in more favorable treatment for
ADEA claimants than is available to Title VII claimants is not entirely
persuasive." 8 The possibility that the RFOA exception was included in
the ADEA because Congress intended to extend more protection to victims
of age discrimination than it had provided to victims of race and sex
discrimination simply cannot be disregarded.
D. The Impact Of Shifting The Burden Of Proof To The Employer
Even for those courts that have applied McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
in the ADEA context, 51 9 shifting the burden of proof to the employer
may not represent the drastic change that Professor Eglit suggests.'60
Interpreting the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense appears to
require a modification of only the second step of the McDonnell Douglasi
Burdine approach.' 6 ' If the employer was able to satisfy its increased
burden under that step, then the plaintiff presumably would have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the "reasonable factor other than age"

The ideal portfolio of constitutionally-mandated legislative action, court interpretation, and administrative procedures is not uniform but is tailored to the discriminatory evil at issue. Different procedural and substantive structures for different
proscribed evils does not reflect a hierarchy of protected groups or evils but recognizes
the special needs of protected groups and the differing sources and impacts of
proscribed evils, the necessary predicate to creating a system of equal opportunity.
But cf. Eglit, supra note 61, at 204 ("Common sense supports the proposition that the extent of
statutory protection should correlate with the perniciousness of the evil regulated.").
158. Cf Spanier v. Morrison's Management Servs., Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 & n.1 (11th Cir.
1987) (Hill, J., concurring) (noting that ADEA victims do receive more favorable treatment than
Title VII claimants, and suggesting that if that is not what Congress intended, the correction must
come from "that branch of the government," rather than from the courts).
159. It has been suggested that a number of courts that claim to be applying McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine in ADEA cases are not actually doing so. Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L.
Rav. 601, 627-28 (1987).
160. See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 61, at 199. See also Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 304-05.
161. See, e.g., EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 489 F. Supp. 1003, 1006-08 (D. Minn. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1981). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Burdine, there was support for the conclusion that, even in Title VII cases, the burden of proof
shifted to the employer under the second prong of McDonnell Douglas. As one commentator noted:
[The McDonnell Douglas] formulation ... left unclear the precise nature of the
burden that is shifted [to the employer under the second prong of the test]. One
interpretation is that only the burden of production shifts and that the defendant
therefore need only produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for his actions
in order to rebut the presumption that arises from the prima facie showing.
Alternatively, [McDonnell Douglas] may be read as shifting the entire burden of
persuasion to the defendant once the prima facie showing is made. In general, the
federal court of appeals which have considered this issue have interpreted [McDonnell
Douglas] as establishing the latter rule in Title VII cases.
Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REv. 380, 389 (1976)
(citing cases); see also Eglit, supra note 61, at 169 n.55.
Indeed, the plaintiff in one pre-Burdine case, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 311-13
(6th Cir. 1975), argued (unsuccessfully) that because the prevailing interpretation of Title VII should
be extended to cases arising under the ADEA, the employer in an ADEA case should be required
to bear the burden of proof under the second prong of McDonnell Douglas. For an interesting
(pre-Burdine) discussion of Laugesen, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HAgv. L. Rav. 380, 391-92 (1976).
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relied upon by the employer was pretextual. This would equate to the
plaintiff's opportunity, under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach,
to demonstrate that the "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" was pretextual. 62 Thus, although the courts have not focused on the issue,
requiring employers to bear the burden of proof need not entirely undermine the applicability of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in ADEA
cases. 163
It is true that even so limited a modification of the McDonnell Douglasi
Burdine approach may be outcome-determinative in some cases.164 The
purpose of allocating the burden of proof is, after all, to determine
which party will prevail in cases where the trier of fact is left unper65
suaded. 1
In the analogous Equal Pay Act context, for example, the court in
Brewster v. Barnes' 66 upheld a finding that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that her employer had intentionally discriminated against her
(thereby precluding recovery under Title VII), but nevertheless held that
the employer had violated the Equal Pay Act because it had failed to
satisfy its burden of establishing that its actions were based on a factor
other than sex. 67 In other words, had only the traditional McDonnell

Douglas test applied in Brewster, the employer would have prevailed.
Because the Equal Pay Act's "factor other than sex" exception is an
affirmative defense that has the effect of shifting the burden of proof
to the employer, however, the plaintiff prevailed.'"

162. See Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, Proving a Violation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 803, 856 (1987). But cf. Monroe v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Pretext, as such, does not come into
play in evaluating an affirmative defense."), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
163. See Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. Zimmer, Proving a Violation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 17 SETON HALL. L. REV. 803, 853, 856 (1987); cf. Duffy v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1400-01 (3rd Cir.). (Adams, J., dissenting) (fact
that the third step of the McDonnell Douglas approach may not be applied in an ADEA case "in
exactly the same fashion as in a Title VII action" would not "undermine the usefulness of McDonnell
Douglas' three-step allocation of the evidentiary burden"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
164. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 158 (observing that the denomination of the RFOA provision
as an affirmative defense "may well be outcome-determinative in at least some cases").
165. See, e.g., Churchill v. International Business Mach., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089, 1096 (D.N.J.
1991) ("If the trier is in doubt, it must decide against the party bearing the burden of proof.")
(Equal Pay Act case); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 380, 389 n.53 (1976) ("When the evidence finally goes to the fact-finder, the party with the
burden of persuasion will lose . . . unless the evidence . . . is persuasive to the required degree, a
preponderance of the evidence in civil actions under the ADEA."); Robert Belton, Burdens of
Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1205, 1216 (1981) ("When the parties are in dispute over a material element of a case,
the party having the burden of persuasion on that element will lose if the factfinder's mind is in
equipoise after he has considered all the relevant evidence.").
166. 788 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1986).
167. Id. at 992-93.
168. See also Spray v. Kellos-Sims Crane Rental, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 745, 751-52 (S.D. Ga. 1981):
At first, it may appear inconsistent that plaintiff can recover under the Equal Pay
The plaintiff has made out a
Act claim and not under the Title VII claim ....
prima facie case under both causes of action. On the Title VII claim, however,
the defendant has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose which is not
pretextual for plaintiff's determination [sic]. On the other hand, the defendant has
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Nevertheless, that shifting the burden of proof to the employer would
be outcome-determinative less often than Professor Eglit believes is suggested by a closer examination of Schulz v. Hickock Manufacturing Co. 69

Professor Eglit cites Schulz in support of his conclusion that many future
ADEA cases may be decided differently if the RFOA exception is interpreted as an affirmative defense. 170 Professor Eglit also correctly observes that the court in Schulz required the employer to prove that the
plaintiff had been discharged because of reasonable factors other than

age.'17 It is not clear, however, that the outcome in Schulz-judgment
in favor of the plaintiff172-would have been different if the court instead
had utilized the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdineburden of proof

allocation.

'71

Professor Eglit argues to the contrary, calling Schulz a "striking"
example $of the impact to be expected from shifting the burden of proof

to the employer.

74

Citing the court's observation that Schulz was a "rather

not rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie Equal Pay Act claim by evidence sufficient
to satisfy the Court of the defendant's nondiscriminatory intentions. Where the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and shifted the burden of proof to the
extent that her case has been established by a preponderance of the evidence, unless
it is rebutted to the extent that the Court is at least equally disposed toward the
contentions of the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff must prevail. Thus, while
paradoxical, the different results of the two causes of action are not inconsistent.
See also Churchill v. International Business Mach., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089, 1097 (D.N.J. 1991)
("[lit is possible that a plaintiff could fail to meet its burden of proving a Title VII violation,
and at the same time the employer could fail to carry its burden of proving an affirmative defense
under the Equal Pay Act."); Eglit, supra note 61, at 202 n.228 (citing Spray for the proposition
that an employer "conceivably could establish enough-e.g., articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason-to evade Title VII liability, yet at the same time fail to establish enough to prove an
affirmative [Equal Pay Act] defense, and so it would be liable under the [Equal Pay Act]").
169. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
170. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 158-59 n.13, 199 & n.215.
In considering this point, it is useful to bear in mind the following discussion of the potential
impact of shifting the burden of proof to the employer (by applying Equal Pay Act analysis) in
wage discrimination cases arising under Title VII:
Adoption of the "equivalence" rule .. . that . .. Equal Pay Act analysis is to
be used for .. . cases under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, theoretically
will not affect cases where the plaintiff could prove the pay differential was not
justified by .. .any .. . factor other than sex, nor any case where the defendant
could prove the wage differential was justified.
The rule should only affect cases where the factfinder cannot decide whether the
differential is justified. In these cases it then becomes important to determine who
is left with the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion. If this set of cases is small, the
significance of the "equivalence" rule, which places the risk of nonpersuasion ...
on the defendant in comparison to leaving it on the plaintiff under the traditional
Title VII analysis, is also small.
DaNay A. Kalkowski, Note, Does Liability Under The Equal Pay Act Automatically Lead to Title
VII Liability?-Falon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989), 70 NEa. L. REV. 614,
629 (1991).
171. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 158 n.13.
172. See Schulz, 358 F. Supp. at 1217.
173. The three-step McDonnell Douglas approach is most useful where the parties' respective
rights are determined on a state of the record at some stage short of full proof, and is less
enlightening where, as in Schulz, both parties have been allowed to present all of their evidence.
See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1981).
174. Eglit, supra note 61, at 158 n.13.
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close case" in which the fact that the employer bore the burden of proof
"require[d] that judgment be for the plaintiff,""' Professor Eglit concludes that "[i]t was the heavy burden borne by the defendant which
76
dictated the . . . conclusion in Schulz."'
It is, however, not certain that imposing the burden upon the plaintiff
would have mandated judgment in favor of the employer. Professor
Eglit's contrary conclusion is based upon an incorrect application of the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach to the facts in Schulz. Professor
Eglit states:
Had the defendant only borne a burden of articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its discharge of the plaintiff, the presentation of evidence establishing the undisputed fact that the company
was in serious economic straits, combined with the fact that Schulz
failed to meet the demands for increased sales which were set in order
to help the company pull out of its dire position, clearly would have
sufficed.

177

The problem with this analysis is that Professor Eglit has ignored the
critical third step in the McDonnell Douglas/Burdineanalysis: determining
whether the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" articulated by the
employer was pretextual.' 78 While one cannot be certain that the court
in Schulz would have found the employer's proffered reason to be
pretextual, its reasoning suggests that it is likely to have reached precisely
that conclusion. For example, while the fact that the employer in Schulz
was experiencing serious economic difficulties was indeed undisputed, the
additional fact upon which Professor Eglit bases his conclusion that the
employer would have prevailed under McDonnell Douglas and Burdinethat the plaintiff "failed to meet the demands for increased sales which
79
were set in order to help the company pull out of its dire position' ' clearly was not.
On the contrary, the court noted the absence of any evidence that this
alleged reason for the plaintiff's discharge had ever been communicated
to him. 80 Likewise, the court observed that the plaintiff's testimony that
he had never been asked to draw up a plan for his sales district and
had never been presented with a plan drawn up by other company
representatives was "essentially uncontradicted." 8 ' The court's conclusion

175.
176.
177.
178.

Schulz, 358 F. Supp. at 1216.
Eglit, supra note 61, at 159 n.13.
Id. at 158 n.13.
As to the importance of the third step, see, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867,

870 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Because of the employee's easy burden of establishing a prima facie case
and the employer's normal ability to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions, most disparate treatment cases turn on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that the
nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer was a pretext for discrimination."); Craig H.
King, Comment, Employment Discrimination: The Burden of Proof, 13 S.U. L. REv. 91, 95 (1986)

("The vast majority of disparate treatment cases will turn on the third stage.").
179. Eglit, supra note 61, at 158 n.13.
180. Schulz, 358 F. Supp. at 1216.
181. Id. at 1215.
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from this that "the reasons for plaintiff's discharge [were] not satisfactorily explained' '81 2 supports the inference that it found (or would have

found) the employer's proffered reason to be pretextual.183 In any event,

it is impossible to preclude that possibility, as Professor Eglit's interpretation effectively does.
That Professor Eglit has overstated the significance of shifting the
burden of proof to the employer seems even more likely when one
considers that age discrimination claims are now typically tried before a
jury.'8 The difficulty in attempting to apply McDonnell Douglas and

Burdine in the jury trial context has received considerable attention" 5
and may have led to the reversal of a number of jury verdicts in ADEA
cases. 86 One court has stated, for example, that "McDonnell Douglas
was not written as a prospective jury charge; to read its technical aspects
to a jury . . . may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to
legalisms to decide the ultimate question
seize upon poorly understood
8 7

of discrimination."
It is particularly difficult to frame instructions that allow the jury to

infer discrimination from a prima facie showing without suggesting that

182. Id.
183. Cf. Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1991) ("If at the time of the
adverse employment decision the decisionmaker gave one reason, but at the time of the trial gave
a different reason which was unsupported by the documentary evidence, the jury could reasonably
conclude that the new reason was a pretextual after-the-fact justification."), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2995 (1992).
184. The decision in Schulz, which involved a trial to the court, see 358 F. Supp. at 1210,
predated the Supreme Court's holding in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) that jury trials
are available in cases arising under the ADEA, as well as the 1978 amendments to the ADEA that
effectively codified the Lorillard holding by adding a jury trial provision to the Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(2) (1982).
185. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1981); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975); Eglit, supra note 61, at 169 n.62; Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73
VA. L. REV. 601, 626 (1987); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 FfARV.
L. REV. 380, 398 (1976); Alan A. Blakeboro, Allocation of Proof in ADEA Cases: A Critique of
the Prima Facie Case Approach, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 90, 103 (1980); Jeffrey L. Liddle, Disparate
Treatment Claims Under ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 5 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 549, 557-58 (1979).
186. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting) (citing Kimberlye K. Fayssoux,
Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change,
73 VA. L. REV. 601 (1987)). But cf. Mack A. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621, 673
n.184 (1983) ("It seems clear that under the ADEA when a jury makes a finding of motivation,
that finding will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant can demonstrate a clear lack of
evidentiary support for the verdict.").
187. Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (lst Cir. 1979). See also Mark I. Schickman, The
Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA,
32 HASTINGs L.J. 1239, 1258 (1981):
[T]he McDonnell Douglas formulation was created for the judge-tried proceeding
provided by Title VII. Most of the formula is irrelevant or, worse, confusing to
a jury. It can distract a jury in the usual case in which the proof of discrimination
with which the jury must be concerned is tangential to the McDonnell Douglas
debate, which is directed at lawyers and judges .... As a result, the basic question
of age as a "but for" factor may be forgotten.
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the employer bears the burden of persuading the jury that age was not
a factor in its decision.'18 Indeed, some courts claiming to have applied
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in ADEA cases appear to have permitted
the jury to evaluate the credibility of the articulated reasons for the
employer's actions .8 9 These courts were in reality modifying the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach by effectively requiring the employer
to bear the burden of proof on the issue of intent.' 90
That analysis is consistent with the recognition in a number of cases
(including Burdine) of the need for the employer to persuade the trier
of fact of the lawfulness of its conduct, even though the burden of
proof technically may be on the plaintiff under the traditional McDonnell
Douglas test.' 9' Professor Eglit described this point in the following terms:
While in theory the employer in a circumstantial evidence discriminatory treatment case bears only a burden of production regarding
[its] explanation, as a matter of practical reality the employer likely
will endeavor to establish this justification as persuasively as it can.
In other words, the intelligent defendant is not going to engage in
some pallid exercise, putting forth a half-hearted presentation labeled
"articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and gambling

188. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HAv. L. REV. 380, 398
(1976).
189. See, e.g., Dragon v. Rhode Island, Dept. of MHRH, 936 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1991) ("A
prima facie case [of discrimination] will permit a plaintiff to reach a jury in the absence of evidence
supporting the defendant, or where the jury might disbelieve that latter evidence .....
) (emphasis
added); Washburn v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 831 F.2d 1404, 1408 (8th Cir. 1987) (even though
the plaintiff had not presented any rebuttal evidence "following [the employer's] showing of
nondiscriminatory reasons for [the plaintiff's] termination," the jury "adopted [the plaintiff's] version
of the case and found the reasons offered by [the employer] to be pretextual and its actions to be
discriminatory"); Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 728 F. Supp. 529, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1989) ("If the jury
found the proffered explanation unworthy of credence, as it apparently did, the substantial inference
of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's prima facie case is sufficient to support the verdict.");
cf. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v Hicks:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus,
rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons ... will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination ....
113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993). But see Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir.
1982) (rejecting the contention that "because a jury may find wholly incredible the defendant's
articulated reasons for the discharge, [the] evidence sufficient to establish [a] prima facie case [of
age discrimination] is necessarily substantial enough to require sending the case to the jury").
190. Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial
By Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 628 (1987).
191. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) ("[Allthough
the defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an
incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation."); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts,
Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.) ("A defendant which is less than honest in proffering its reason
for discharge risks an unnecessary age discrimination verdict."), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052
(1987); see also BARBARA L. SCH.E & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATrON LAW 1312
n.53 (2d ed. 1983) ("[W]hile the defendant does not bear the burden of persuading the court that
its actions were lawful to rebut the prima facie case [under Burdine], the defendant will normally
attempt to prove the factual basis for its actions to enhance the persuasiveness of the proffered
reasons and refute any claims that the reasons are pretextual.").
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that its evidence, while not as compelling as it might have been had
more effort been exerted, nonetheless will be adequate to rebut the
plaintiff's case. Rather, the defendant will do its best to persuade,
even if as a matter of legal theory it need only produce. 92

Professor Eglit concedes that one might conclude from this statement
that "it really makes no difference, at a practical level, whether a
defendant confronts a burden of persuasion or just a burden of pro-94
duction,"'19 although he also cites authority for the contrary conclusion.
In either event, however, formally shifting the burden of proof to the
employer seems likely to make less difference than is suggested by Pro-

so would make it "much harder"
fessor Eglit's observation that doing
9
liability.'
avoid
to
for employers
E.

The Parties' Relative Access To Evidence Favors Shifting The

Burden of Proof
Professor Eglit concludes that it is appropriate to place the burden of

proof on the employer in disparate impact cases, in part because the
employer is likely to have "readier access than its employee to data
justifying, or belying, the policy or practice at issue."' 96 It is unclear
why he does not extend this reasoning to disparate treatment cases as
well,197 particularly in view of the fact that the McDonnell Douglasi

192. Eglit, supra note 61, at 207; see also Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial By Jury: Proposalsfor Change, 73 VA. L. REv. 601, 628
(1987) ("Even though the employer technically has the burden of production in articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision, his credibility is at issue
when he meets this burden solely through testimony.").
193. Eglit, supra, note 61, at 207 n.245; cf. Bd. of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,
439 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In litigation the only way a defendant can
'articulate' the reason for his action is by adducing evidence that explains what he has done; when
an executive takes the witness stand to 'articulate' his reason, the litigant for whom he speaks is
thereby proving those reasons.").
194. Eglit, supra note 61, at 207 n.245 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 947-48 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984)); see also id. at 199 ("burden shifting is more than just a technical issue-it
can be outcome-determinative"); RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 170 (1992) ("[W]here the evidence is clouded, litigation may be
protracted, and the assignment of the burden of proof is often decisive."). See generally Lavine
v. Miller, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976) ("Where the burden of proof lies on a given issue is, of course,
); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
rarely without consequence and frequently may be dispositive ....
§ 2485 n.4 (Chadbourn Revision 1981) ("It is ... a fallacy to suppose that the necessity of
apportioning the burden of proof is a 'technical, formal, legal' doctrine, which is due solely to the
artificiality of the legal rules of pleading .... ").
195. EgIit, supra note 61, at 198; cf. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1215 (7th Cir. 1989)
(observing that a plaintiff proceeding under the traditional McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach
would merely have "a little tougher road" than would a plaintiff in a case in which the burden
was on the employer to establish that its actions were based on factors other than sex).
1%. Eglit, supra note 61, at 223. But cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: Tn CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 367 (1992) ("[P]roof of discriminatory intent should
be strictly required, especially in the pattern and practice cases that are grist for the disparate impact
mill. .. . Finding proof of the illegality of these pervasive practices should not be difficult, given
the many modern discovery techniques available to the plaintiff.").
197. Although Professor Eglit is silent on this point, the context suggests that he is distinguishing
between disparate impact cases and disparate treatment cases in this regard. See Eglit, supra note
61, at 223-24.
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Burdine approach itself is occasionally characterized as an attempt to
respond to this problem. 98
In other words, it would be unusual for an employer who has intentionally discriminated on the basis of age to leave evidence of that fact. 1
Any evidence that does exist is likely to be within the employer's control,
where the plaintiff may have difficulty discovering it.20 This difference
between the parties' relative access to evidence suggests that an employer
should be required to respond to a plaintiff's prima facie case by disproving that it had intentionally discriminated. 20
F. The Impact Of The ADEA 's Liquidated Damages Provision
One aspect of the ADEA regarding the proper interpretation of the
RFOA exception that Professor Eglit does not discuss is the provision
for the recovery of liquidated damages in cases involving "willful" violations. 2 2 The Supreme Court has described this provision as having created
a "two-tiered" scheme of ADEA liability. 203
The first "tier" arises when the plaintiff proves an ADEA violation,
but there is no evidence that the violation was willful. In these cases the
employer is. liable for unpaid wages.204 "Second tier" liability exists when
there has been a willful violation of the ADEA, in which case the employer
also is liable for "liquidated" damages in an amount equal to the amount
of the unpaid wages.20
Application of the two-tiered liability scheme is illustrated by the
decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston.206 In that case, TWA

198. See, e.g., Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Mhe central purpose
behind the McDonnell Douglas method ... is to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of having to
uncover what is very difficult to uncover-evidence of discriminatory intent."); La Montagne v.
American Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The indirect method
[of proof] compensates for these evidentiary difficulties by permitting the plaintiff to prove his case
by eliminating all lawful motivations, instead of proving directly an unlawful motivation.").
199. See La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1410; Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages,
and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 H Av. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 715, 722 (1990).
200. La Montagne, 750 F.2d at 1410; Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967,
90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 393 & n.81 (1976).
201. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380,
392-93 (1976); Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 V"aD. L. REv. 1205, 1284 (1981). See generally WIaMoRE ON
EVIDENCE § 2486 (Chadbourn Revision 1981) (the burden of proof is often placed on "the party
who presumably has peculiar means of knowledge enabling him to prove its falsity if it is false").
But cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[mhe
suggestion that the employer should bear the burden of persuasion due to superior access to evidence
has little force ... where the liberal discovery rules available to all litigants are supplemented by
EEOC investigatory files.").
202. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
203. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985).
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 626(b); Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1064 (7th Cir.
1989).
205. Section 7(b) of the ADEA incorporates § 16(b) of the FLSA, which in turn provides that
an employer who violates the FLSA shall be liable to the employee for the amount of unpaid
wages and "an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Section 7(b)
limits the recovery of liquidated damages to cases involving willful violations of the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 626(b). See generally Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1064 & n.2.
206. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
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had adopted a policy that permitted pilots disqualified from serving in
that capacity for reasons other than age to transfer to the position of
flight engineer, but provided no similar opportunity to pilots who were
required to retire at age sixty.2 °0 The Supreme Court held that the policy
discriminated against protected individuals on the basis of age and therefore violated the ADEA. 20 8
The Court further held, however, that because TWA officials had
sought legal advice and consulted with the pilots' union prior to implementing the policy, it had not acted willfully. 2° 9 The Court approved a
standard for willfulness that results in an award of liquidated damages
only if the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the
fact that its conduct violated the ADEA. 210 It rejected a less stringent
standard that would have required an award of liquidated damages 2if
the employer merely was aware that the ADEA was "in the picture." ,'
In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized that because virtually
21 2
all employers are aware of the potential applicability of the ADEA,
an "in the picture" standard would result in an award of liquidated
damages in almost every case in which an employer was found to have
violated the ADEA.2 1 1 That result, 21 4in the Court's opinion, would be
contrary to the intent of Congress.
The standard for awarding liquidated damages approved in Thurston
has proven to be considerably easier to apply in disparate impact cases
than in disparate treatment cases. 215 The relative ease with which Thurston
can be applied in disparate impact cases arises from the fact that the
factfinder can make a finding of discrimination (that is, of "tier one"
liability) without inquiring into the employer's state of mind. 216 After an
initial finding of discrimination, the factfinder proceeds to an analysis
liability: determining whether the statutory violation
of "second tier"
' '217
was "willful.
To establish "first tier" liability in a disparate treatment case, on the
other hand, an inquiry into the employer's state of mind generally has
been required. 2 8 That inquiry typically involves a determination as to
21 9
whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.

207. Id. at 114-18.
208. Id. at 124.
209. Id. at 129-30.
210. Id. at 126.
211. Id. at 127-28.
212. Id. at 128.
213. Id. at 128 & n.22.
214. Id. at 128.
215. See Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1412-15 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded,
113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993); Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1065 (7th Cir. 1989); Lindsey v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 1987); Dreyer v. Arco Chem.
Co., 801 F.2d 651, 656 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
216. Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1065.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1066.
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Because most courts have concluded that there is no meaningful distinction
between a finding of intentional discrimination and the finding of "willfulness" necessary for an award of liquidated damages, 220 a finding that

establishes first tier liability also results in a finding of "second tier"

liability in virtually every disparate treatment case. 22'
Some courts have suggested that liquidated damages were meant to be

available in all disparate treatment cases, and unavailable in disparate
impact cases. 2m However, that conclusion is unsatisfying for three reasons. 223 First, there is nothing in the legislative history of the ADEA to
support the conclusion. 24 In addition, it ignores the fact that the law is

unsettled as to whether disparate impact analysis even applies in ADEA
cases. 225 Finally, although one can argue that liquidated damages should
be awarded in every disparate treatment case, 226 that conclusion cannot

easily be reconciled with the admonition in Thurston that courts should

avoid imposing liquidated damages in every case in which the ADEA
has been violated.227 Courts have interpreted this to mean that the recovery
of liquidated damages should be the exception rather than the rule.2
The court in Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co.229 attempted to address the
problem by distinguishing between "intentional" and "willful" ADEA
violations. 2 0 It concluded that a duplication of the evidence necessary
220. See, e.g., Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
221. Id.; Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1067.
222. See, e.g., Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981) ("One
could readily conclude from [an analysis of the liquidated damages provision] that liquidated damages
will always be available to a plaintiff who establishes liability under the ADEA on a discriminatory
intent rather than a discriminatory impact theory."), overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt
Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Spanier v. Morrison's Management Serv.,
Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 (lth Cir. 1987) (Hill, J.,concurring):
In studying the ADEA and cases brought under it, I have concluded that where
a defendant loses a typical case, the employer has necessarily been found guilty of
a willful violation of the ADEA, and liquidated damages are required. Disparate
impact cases such as Thurston are the only conceivable exception.
223. Cf. Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (lth Cir. 1987) ("we
hesitate to hold that every plaintiff who wins in the liability phase of a McDonnell Douglas age
discrimination case should automatically receive liquidated damages").
224. See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc., 665 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled
on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988). Indeed, the
Syvock court relied upon statements from the floor debates at the time that the ADEA was enacted
(and in particular upon those of Representative Burke, one of the ADEA's sponsors) indicating
that-Congress thought that unintentional discrimination against a single individual was possible to
conclude that distinguishing between intentional and unintentional violations of the ADEA "is just
as necessary in disparate treatment cases as it is when the plaintiff sues on a discriminatory impact
theory." Id. at 155 & n.8.
225. See supra note 7.
226. See, e.g., Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Even if . . . Thurston
... lead[s] to a willfulness finding in almost all successful individual treatment cases, '[plerhaps
that is as it should be, given the nature of a disparate treatment case."') (quoting Burlew v. Eaton
Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1989)).
227. See Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 1989); Lindsey v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (lth Cir. 1987).
228. See EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 741 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
229. 801 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987).
230. Id. at 657. See generally Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1184 (6th Cir. 1983)
(Congress intended "to make a meaningful distinction between willful violations of the Act and
violations that are not willful").
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to establish an underlying violation of the ADEA (i.e., intentional dis23
crimination) should be insufficient to support a finding of willfulness. '
Relying upon Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
court modified the Thurston standard by requiring "additional evidence
of outrageous conduct" before permitting an award of liquidated

damages. 232

233

The Dreyer court's analysis has been subject to considerable criticism.
Most courts that have considered the issue have held that a requirement
of outrageousness would focus, at least implicitly, on whether the employer
had an "evil motive. ' 23 4 This notion of "evil motive" was specifically
rejected in Thurston.235 In Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,236 for
example, the court noted that although the Dreyer court had attempted
to avoid an interpretation of the liquidated damages provision that would
require a finding of evil motive, the Restatement section upon which it
test specifically defines outrelied in formulating its "outrageousness"
237
rageousness in terms of evil motive.
A number of courts seem to have concluded that two-tiered liability
cannot exist in the disparate treatment context. 238 However, the Dreyer
court actually was correct in suggesting that two-tiered liability can be
preserved in disparate treatment cases if the plaintiff is required to meet
239 By
a higher burden of proof in order to receive liquidated damages.
permitting an ADEA plaintiff to establish "tier one" liability without
presenting evidence of the employer's state of mind, a court will preserve
two tiered liability while avoiding the criticism levelled against the Dreyer

231. Dreyer, 801 F.2d at 658.

232. Id. See generally Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1067 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) ("In an
effort to resolve [the] problem, the Third Circuit has adopted a more stringent standard of willfulness
than the Thurston standard, requiring a showing of 'outrageousness' for awarding liquidated damages.");
cf. EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 741 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (concluding
that because Congress intended for liquidated damages to be available only in the exceptional case,
there would be too large a percentage of cases in which liquidated damages are awarded even if
the Thurston standard is deemed to be greater than "intentional").
233. See Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 565 n.4 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The Dreyer
opinion has been rejected or criticized by several circuits.").
234. Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1989); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert
Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1988).
235. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125.

236. 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
237. Id. at 1550 & n.5; see also Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1989).
The criticism of Dreyer is not entirely compelling. The Court in Thurston held that the Second
Circuit's standard for determining willfulness-whether the employer knew or showed reckless
disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA-was reasonable. It did not hold
that the standard was required. Thus, while Thurston does not require a finding of outrageousness,
it does not necessarily preclude such a requirement. See generally Peter J. Ennis & Gary R. Kelly,

The Standards for Awarding Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act-a Need.for Uniformity, 17 EMILoY REL. L.J. 237, 254 n.28 (1991). To date, however, no
other court has been willing to embrace the Third Circuit's approach. See Cooper, 836 F.2d at
1550-51; Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1338 (7th Cir. 1987) (Manion, J., concurring

in part), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S.
238. See Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953
113 S.Ct. 1701 (1993); Spanier v. Morrison's
Cir. 1987) (Hill, J., concurring).
239. Cf. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696

1020 (1988).
F.2d 1405, 1415 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded,
Management Services, Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 (11th
F.2d 1176, 1184 (6th Cir. 1983).
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test. 2 4 Furthermore, by modifying the finding

necessary for first tier rather than second tier liability, the court will
achieve a result consistent with the view that the RFOA exception is an

affirmative defense.
This conclusion draws some support from the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins.241 In that case, the Court
granted certiorari to reexamine the standard for determining "willfulness"
under the ADEA in view of the lower federal courts' continuing confusion
concerning the proper interpretation of Thurston.242 In reaffirming the
Thurston "willfulness" standard, the Court indicated that its application
is consistent with the ADEA's two-tiered liability scheme "across the
range of ADEA cases" because the ADEA contains several statutory

"exemptions" that an employer can invoke as defenses in a disparate
243
treatment case.
Among the "exemptions" to which the Court was referring is the
"bona fide occupational qualification," or "BFOQ," exception, 244 which
unquestionably is an affirmative defense. 245 Significantly, the analogy
between the BFOQ exception and the RFOA exception has been cited
2
as a basis for treating the latter as an affirmative defense as well. 46

240. See Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989).
241. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).
242. Id. at 1704-05, 1708-09. The Court noted that several courts have attempted to modify or
declined to follow Thurston on the ground that its literal application would undermine the ADEA's
"two-tiered" liability scheme. Id. at 1709.
243. Id. However, the Court does not appear to have been entirely convinced, since it also
criticized the lower courts' emphasis on the two-tiered liability issue, noting that "[t]he two-tiered
liability principle was simply one interpretive tool among several that we used in Thurston to decide
what Congress meant by the word 'willful,"' and observed that the ADEA "does not provide for
liquidated damages 'where consistent with the principle of a two-tiered liability scheme,"' k5ut "where
the violation was 'willful'." Id.
244. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). The BFOQ exception is available to an employer who has acknowledged
that age was a determining factor in an employment decision, see BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 507 (2d ed. 1983), who then bears the burden of
proving that the decision was justified. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 415-17
(1985); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 365 (D.N.J. 1987).
Although the Hazen Paper court cited no authority on the point, its characterization of the
impact of the exception on the ADEA's two-tiered liability scheme is supported by the analysis in
Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1989), where the court stated:
[I]t is not necessarily true that the Thurston standard, unadorned by any "outrageousness" requirement, will lead to an automatic willfulness finding every time
a jury finds an ADEA violation in an individual treatment case. For example, an
employer may have a valid legal question about whether age is a bona fide
occupational qualification ....
An employer that is incorrect but not reckless in
determining that age is a b.f.o.q. does not act willfully.
245. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The alternative defense
in § 4(0(1) [of the ADEA]-the bona fide occupational qualifications-is an affirmative defense .... ").
246. See Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The 'reasonable
factors' defense appears alongside the BFOQ exception in the ADEA ... and is an affirmative
defense for which the employer bears the burden of proof."), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S.
400 (1985). Professor Eglit has noted that the RFOA's placement in the ADEA "contiguous to the
BFOQ defense" should not be "lightly dismissed" as a basis for treating the RFOA exception as
an affirmative defense and "rejecting a reading which equates Burdine and the RFOA exception."
Eglit, supra note 61, at 225.
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Using reasoning similar to that found in Hazen Paper Company, the
court in Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc. 247 suggested that the RFOA
exception is an affirmative defense. Because the Cowen court found no
meaningful distinction between a finding of intentional discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas and the finding of "willfulness"

necessary for

an award of liquidated damages, 248 it concludedthat a finding of "first
tier" liability under McDonnell Douglas makes an award of liquidated
damages virtually automatic in disparate treatment cases. 249 The court
described this result as "confused," and concluded that it is virtually
impossible to make sense of the ADEA's liquidated damages provision
"as long as the federal courts continue to apply McDonnell Douglas and

Burdine to ADEA [disparate treatment] cases and refuse to acknowledge
25 0
the possibility of liability for non-intentional age discrimination.

The Cowen court suggested that one possible alternative to applying
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in ADEA cases would be to treat the

RFOA exception as an affirmative defense. 25' Under that approach, if
the plaintiff fails to convince (or does not attempt to convince) the
factfinder that the employer's conduct was intentionally discriminatory,
and the employer fails to prove that its employment action was based
on reasonable factors other than age, 25 2 the employer would be liable for

back pay.253 In order to recover liquidated damages, however, the plaintiff
employer intended to discriminate
would be required to prove that the 254
(i.e., that its conduct was "willful").

247. 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
248. Id. at 1581.
249. Id. See also Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc., 665 F.2d 149, 155 n.7 (7th Cir.
1981) ("If an inference of discriminatory motive were ... crucial to recovery upon a disparate
treatment theory under the ADEA, one could conclude that any ADEA violation premised upon
disparate treatment is intentional and therefore liquidated damages should be automatic."), overruled
on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988).
250. Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1580-81; cf. Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Because a finding of liability under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine is generally equated
with a finding of intentional discrimination, the application of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in
ADEA cases cannot easily be reconciled with Thurston.).
251. Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1579-80.
252. Cf. Churchill v. International Business Mach., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089, 1097 (D.N.J. 1991)
("It is possible that a plaintiff could fail to meet its burden of proving a Title VII violation, and
at the same time the employer could fail to carry its burden of proving an affirmative defense
under the Equal Pay Act."). The possibility envisioned in Churchill materialized in Tidwell v. Fort
Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1993) and Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 992-93 (4th
Cir. 1986).
253. In Burlew v. Eaton Corp., for example, the court observed that the rejection of the employer's
proffered reason does not necessarily mandate a finding that its conduct was consciously discriminatory. 869 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. Churchill, 759 F. Supp. at 1096-97 ("A successful
Equal Pay Act claim is not inconsistent with finding that the employer did not intentionally
discriminate because discriminatory intent is not an element of an Equal Pay Act claim."). If the
RFOA exception is regarded as an affirmative defense, the possibility alluded to in Burlew would
result in an award of back pay, but not in an award of liquidated damages. Indeed, had the jury
in Burlew been instructed properly (and had the plaintiff's assertion of a non-willful violation been
timely), that presumably would have been the result reached in that case. See Burlew, 869 F.2d at
1064, 1069.
254. Cf. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 155-56 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir 1988).
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In summary, the language of the ADEA suggests that a plaintiff should
be able to establish "first tier" liability without showing that the employer's conduct was "willful.1 25 5 Because an interpretation that regards

the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense would place the burden
of proof on the issue of intent on the employer, it is consistent with
the existence of two-tiered liability. That interpretation of the exception
may be preferable to the one advanced by Professor Eglit for two reasons:
(1) it gives full effect to the RFOA exception;25 6 and (2) it preserves the
ADEA's two-tiered liability scheme in disparate treatment cases. 25 7 While

the percentage of cases in which an employer that has violated the ADEA
will avoid an award of liquidated damages may be small under either

approach,258 the affirmative defense interpretation is less susceptible to
9
25
criticism on that ground than is Professor Eglit's approach.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In attempting to formulate an acceptable interpretation of the RFOA
exception, Professor Eglit has addressed an issue that generally has been
ignored by the courts and commentators considering the ADEA. 260 Professor Eglit does not claim that the bifurcated interpretation that he
proposes is entirely consistent with the language of the ADEA. 26, In fact,

255. See Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. EEOC v. Century
Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1466 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., dissenting) ("The principle
that age discrimination can be unconsciously motivated provides a basis for distinguishing between
willful and non-willful discrimination in disparate treatment cases."); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp.,
696 F.2d 1176, 1184 (6th Cir. 1983) ("It appears that Congress, in adopting the liquidated damages
provision, sought to distinguish cases in which there is intentional discrimination from those where
the employer's discrimination is not intentional .... Congress evidently intended that a plaintiff be
able to prove age discrimination without proving intent to discriminate.").
256. Cf. Eglit, supra, note 61, at 160 (conceding that Professor Eglit's approach does not "entirely"
respond to "the RFOA provision's placement in the ADEA, to legislative history, and to the press
of analogical reasoning").
257. Cf. Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1989) (implicitly questioning
the extension of Title VII cases such as Burdine to the ADEA in view of the fact that "Title VII
does not set up a two-tier liability scheme").
258. Cf. EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734, 741 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
("Congress clearly intended that the liquidated damages provisions apply to the exceptional case
rather than the normal case.").
259. See Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1576, 1581 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (Under
McDonnell Douglas, "as a practical matter, liquidated damages are virtually automatic if there is
to be any monetary recovery at all by the employee.").
There is room for a contrary argument. It may be that an ADEA plaintiff can prevail under
the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting approach without actually establishing "conscious,
intentional discrimination" on the part of the employer. See Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063,
1066, 1069 n.10 (7th Cir. 1989). If that is true, the preservation of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
would not necessarily undermine the two-tiered liability scheme envisioned in Thurston. Burlew, 869
F.2d at 1065-67. That conclusion is, however, contrary to the manner in which McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine generally are interpreted. See id. at 1066-67.
260. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 157 (referring to the "lack" both of judicial analysis and scholarly
examination" of the "proper characterization of the RFOA exception"); see also id. at 159-60.
261. To his credit, Professor Eglit has made the case against his proposed interpretation with
considerable force and clarity (the only exception being his failure to consider the impact of the
ADEA's liquidated damages provision). Indeed, he acknowledges that "[c]haracterization of the
RFOA exception as an affirmative defense is . . . solidly supported both on analytical and policy
grounds" and is the "better supported interpretation." Eglit, supra note 61, at 196, 198.
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he admits that his interpretation is intended to preserve a body of precedent
because the courts have failed to give full effect
that has arisen precisely 262
to the RFOA exception.

Professor Eglit concludes, however, that his approach is the best attainable "given the dual legitimate imperatives of according the RFOA
exception its proper significance" while simultaneously "conserving, rather
than undermining, existing non-RFOA case law. '263 Because it serves
(largely) to explain existing law, he argues, the approach should not be
language,
objectionable as long as the conflicts it poses with statutory
26
intolerable.
not
are
law
case
and
policy,
history,
legislative
Yet, the presumed desirability of preserving McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine upon which Professor Eglit's approach is based 265 is questionable. 266 Even in Title VII cases, courts have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.26 7 The additional problems inherent in
extending the approach to the jury-trial context

26 8

militate in favor of

269

modifying it or abandoning it altogether.
The recent enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which extends the right to a jury trial to many
Title VII cases, 270 can be expected to increase the pressure for change.2 7'
Those who advocate the modification or abandonment of McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine point out that, in order to fulfill its function, a
jury must be allowed to assess the employer's credibility in articulating
a reason for its actions, and that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach does not allow for that fact. 272 In cases arising under the ADEA,

262. In summarizing his approach, Professor Eglit said, "Very simply, the RFOA exception is
to be equated openly and avowedly with existing case law. This solution gives formal name to what
in effect already has been occurring in practice." Eglit, supra note 61, at 219. He also admits,
however, that what has been occurring in practice fails to give effect to the RFOA exception. See
id. at 160 (noting "the general failure of the courts to take into account the RFOA provision as
they have devised doctrine in various ADEA settings"); id. (observing that the significance of the
RFOA exception "up to now has been either ignored or unjustifiably discounted"). Indeed, one
reasonably might conclude from the title of his article that this is Professor Eglit's principal point.
263. Eglit, supra note 61, at 225.
264. Id. at 219-20.
265. See id. at 160.
266. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1286 (1981) (shifting the burden to the
employer would "further[] the national policy against discrimination" by requiring employers "to
examine and evaluate their policies and practices in the interest of avoiding both intended and
unintended discriminatory consequences that might be imbedded in their institutional and organizational practices").
267. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 291 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268. See supra notes 184-95 and accompanying text.
269. See Jeffrey L. Liddle, Disparate Treatment Claims Under ADEA: The Negative Impact of
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 549, 557-58 (1980); Kimberlye K. Fayssoux,
Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposalsfor Change,
73 VA. L. REV. 601, 626-28 (1987).
270. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991).
271. See, e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1993).
272. See, e.g., Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967
and Trial by Jury: Proposalsfor Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 628 (1987).
A distinction should be noted here. Professor Eglit states:
Not surprisingly, given the adherence of ADEA courts to Burdine, there are rulings
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the
the necessary correction can be accomplished simply by interpreting
27
RFOA exception as it is written-as an affirmative defense. 1
That interpretation would require the employer to offer substantive
evidence in support of the stated reason for its action, and the credibility
of that evidence would be subject to evaluation by the jury, regardless
274 The
of whether or not the plaintiff offers any evidence of pretext.
would no longer
mere articulation of a reason for the employer's action
27 6
27 5
be sufficient-if it ever was -to

satisfy its burden.

This approach was suggested in Cowen v. Standard Brands, Inc. ,277
but was not adopted in that case out of apparent deference to existing
precedent applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine in the ADEA
context2s--essentially the same concern that prompted the fashioning of
Professor Eglit's approach. 279 The Cowen court correctly perceived, however, that the extension of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine to ADEA

in which courts have not held the defendant to the task of being factually accurate
as to the decision it made. These courts have recognized that the critical concern
is whether the defendant believed that its evaluation of the employee was correct
and whether that belief-although in fact ill-founded-motivated the defendant.
Eglit, supra note 61, at 224-25 n.295. He cites as an example of that proposition the decision in
Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1215 (1984), where the court stated that "[e]ven had the reasons articulated . . . been frivolous or
capricious, had they been the genuine causes of these discharges they would have defeated liability
under the ADEA." Id. at 567.
Contrary to Professor Eglit's suggestion, however, there is little basis for concluding that the
reluctance of courts to inquire into an employer's business judgment is premised upon continued
adherence to Burdine. Abandoning the Burdine approach in favor of an interpretation of the RFOA
exception .asan affirmative defense would merely shift the burden of proof on the relevant issuewhether the employer's articulated reason was the "genuine cause" of its action-from the employee
to the employer. Under either approach, whether the articulated reason was "ill-founded"-that is,
whether the employer's business judgment was correct-would not be dispositive, although it obviously
may be relevant to whether the employer's articulated reason is found to be credible, and therefore
"genuine." Cf. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The reasonableness
of the employer's reasons may of course be probative of whether they are pretexts. The more
idiosyncratic or questionable the employer's reason, the easier it will be to expose it as a pretext,
if indeed it is one. The jury must understand that its focus is to be on the employer's motivation,
however, and not on its business judgment."); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 83
(2d Cir. 1983) ("the jury could have taken the extent to which [the employer's] 'reasons' were wide
of the mark as evidence that they were manufactured to cover discrimination"); Elliott, 714 F.2d
at 567 (employer that offers "a frivolous or capricious reason ... does so at heavy risk that it
will be discounted").
273. See Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 552 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
274. See Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc., 665 F.2d 149, 157 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled
on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); Cowen v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 572.F. Supp. 1576, 1579-80 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Eglit, supra note 61, at 199; Kimberlye K.
Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals
for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 627-28 (1987).
275. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
276. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 199; Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposalsfor Change, 73 VA. L. Rav. 601, 628 (1987).
277. 572 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
278. See id. at 1580-81.
279. Eglit, supra note 61, at 180, 198-99.
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cases cannot be reconciled with the language of the ADEA, 280 a conclusion
that also is suggested by Professor Eglit's analysis. 28'
While the court in Cowen lacked the authority to correct that error,28 2
the federal appellate courts should not hesitate to do so by interpreting
the RFOA exception as an affirmative defense.2 83 If that interpretation
is not what Congress intended, 2 4 "then that branch of the government
must alter the language of the ADEA. ''285

280. Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1580-81.
281. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 160, 196, 203.
282. Professor Eglit characterized the decision in Cowen as being of "dubious validity" in view
of prior authority in the Eleventh Circuit refusing to interpret the RFOA exception as an affirmative
defense. Eglit, supra note 61, at 187 n.151. That criticism is somewhat overstated, since the court
in Cowen stopped short of holding that the RFOA exception is to be interpreted as an affirmative
defense. See Cowen, 572 F. Supp. at 1579-80. Professor Eglit obviously is correct, however, in
concluding that the Cowen court would not have been at liberty to ignore Eleventh Circuit authority
rejecting such an interpretation. See United States v. Nixon, 629 F. Supp. 857, 858-59 (N.D. Ala.
1986); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1984).
283. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("plain language
of ADEA has more authority than ... caselaw") (citing Public Employees Retirement System of
Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403,
1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976) ("The precise language of the Age Act is entitled to greater weight in an
action brought under the Age Act than are . . . decisions construing ... language in Title VII.");
see also Eglit, supra note 61, at 203 (acknowledging that the repudiation of McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine in the ADEA context "would not directly contradict Supreme Court case law").
284. See Eglit, supra note 61, at 225 (suggesting that the current split of authority is attributable
to Congress' failure to anticipate the issue).
285. Spanier v. Morrison's Management Serv., Inc., 822 F.2d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 1987) (Hill,
J., concurring).

